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Mr.  Chalrman;
My name  is George 'W. 
Ball.  I am a member  of the law firm
of' Qleary,  Gottlieb,  Steen and Ball.  I feel  I  ehould  make  it  clear  to thia
Committee  that,  although my firm  acts as legal  couneel in the United States
to the European  Economlc  Commiseion,  which  ig the executive  body of the
European  Common  Market,  I appear  here  today as a private  American
citizen.  The oplnione I  ehaU express  to the Committee  are  my  own an6
ehould not be regarded  ae reflecting  the opinione  of the Commlaeion,
I have been asked to testify  as to the tmplicatione  of the  Eurbpean
Common  Market  and the European  Free  Trade  Aseociation  for  our foreign
trade  and domeetlc  economy.  I understand  that.  the Committee  ie particu-
larly  interegted  in exploring  the consequenceg of one trend  which  the crea-
tion  of those  regional  groupinge  ie  stlmulating  -  the direct  investmerit  by
U4ited  States  firrne  in  producticn  facilitlee  in  Europe.
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I  have made  no syetematic  study  of this  qrrestion.  The  Committee
may,  however,  be intereeted  in  some observations  derived  from  our pro-
fessional  experience  in advising  the managements  of American  companies
regarding  their  European  investment  problems.  I  ehaU direct  these obser-
vatione  at three  questions:
Tirat,  the factors  that are persuading  American  indugtrial
firmg  to eatablieh  production  facilitiee  in Europe;
,F,u"pll9,  the formg  which thoee inveetmente  are  taking  and
are  likely  to take  in  the future;  and
Thir4'  the implicatione  of thie investment  trend  for  American
businees  and labor  and the American  economy as a whole.
Why American  tr'irms  Are  Invegti
The decision  by a corPorate  management  to establish  or  develop
production  facilities  abroad is normally  influenced  by a combination  of con-
siderations  -  not alwaya  articulated  or  fully  undergtood  even by the manage-
ment'  The relative  weight  of the individual  elementa  that contribute  to such
decieiong  varleg  widely  from  eituation  to eituation.  Neverthelegs,  I think
we can isolate  sqme of the principal  motivatione  for  the growing  trend  toward
direct  invegtment  in  Europe.
By  far  the moet  compelling  reason  why  an American  ind.uetrlal
comPany  ahould produce  in  Europe  ie  that  the European  economy  is  growing-3-
at a subetantially  faster  rate  than our  domestic  ecrlnomy.  This  high  rate
of growth  began to develop  momentum  during  the last  decade.  Within  the
paet  two  yeare,  the  creation  of the common  Market  has provided  an addi-
tional  impetue .  It  ia  offering  European  producers  for  the first  time  the
promiee  of a new mass  market,  with  all  the possibititleg  which that impliee
for  the  improvement  of production,  the elimination  or  absorption  of mar_
ginal  producers,  the  modernization  of prod,uction  and distribution  techniquea,
and a full  realLzation  of the economies  of gcale.
Is it  surprieing,  therefore,  that the Common  Market  has become
a magnet  for American  induetry?  lt  of,f,ere  our  more  enterprieing  indug-
trialiste  the challenge  of a new economic  frontier  -  the coming  lnto being
of a market  eerving  a population  approximately  that  of the  United  States
market,  in which the Grose  National  Product  per  capita hae incr  eaeed SO%
in the last  decade white  our  per  capita Gross  National  product  wae increaeing
only  33%,  It  ia  a market  capable  of enormous  expansion,  where  the  stand.ard
of living  is  sti[  far  lower  than in the  United  States  but where  the  maeg  of
the population  ie beginning  for  the firet  time  to want  and expect  the more
elaborate  types  of coneumer  goods.
Granted  all  this,  however,  one may aek why American  induetry
ehould  not be content  to  serve  this  market  by  exporte  frorn  the  United  Statee  -
why it  ig necessary  for  American  firms  to go to the market  to eetablish
production  facilitie  g  .-4-
Obvioualy  many  Amer.ican  firms  plan,  in  fact,  to  eupply  this  rrra,r-
ket  by an increaee  in  their  export  trade.  This  ie particularly  true  where  a
product  required  by  European  conpumere  ie  identicat  with  the  game product
now produced  for  Americans,  and eepecially  where  that  product  ie  not lator_
inteneive.  In  euch a  cerse,  production  at home  may  involve  merely  a amall
addition  to the total  production  on existing  aggembly  linee.  The  reeulting
economy  r.tay be  ao eubgtantial  ae to overcome  any coet advantage  enjoyed
by European  producera.
' But  for  many  typee of goods this  wiu  not be the cage.
A product  may need a epecial design to meet the apecial  require-
menta  of the  European  market,  or  different  degigns  may  be needed for  dif-
ferent  segments  of that  marlcet.  In that  caae it  will  probably  be cheaper  to
fabricate  the product  by using  small-ecale  facilities  in Europe  than under
the mase production  methodg of America.  For  other  products,  traneport
may be a major  element  of coet; in that case aleo it  ie obviously  deairable
that  production  be undertaken  near  the marketplace.  Or  Europe  may offer
advantageg  in  the availability  of  raw  materials  or  of componentg  or  in  other
elemente  of cost.  In addition,  there  may  be  signiflcant  inetitutional  factorg,
involving  consumer  tagtes,  or  the need to adhere  to an indlgenous  set of
busineae  practicee.  Not  only  may  the company  find  it  6egirable  to be iden-
tified  with  the  community  which  it  und,ertakes  to  serve  but,  in fact,  it  may
greatly  benef:it from  the eetrblished  facilities,  reputation  and government
relationg  of a European  partner.
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There  ig  also  the possibility  that  the American  firm  can improve
ite  know-how  and techniques  by acguiring  a prod.rction  source  in.Europe.
Europe  today  ie  alive  with  new techniques  and procesBes  and,  by the creation
of  European  producing  subeidiariee,  American  firma  can frequently  practice
a cross-fertillzation  of ideas.
You will  note  that  I have  failed  to  mention  two  elements  upon which
great  emphaeis  has recently  been placed.  These are,  4rs;q,  the feeling  that
American-produced  goods will  not be able  to  compete  effectively  with  goode
produced  within  the  Common  Market  because  of the  cogt differential  created
by the common  external  tatlfJ.; and,  aecondly,  the deeire  of American  firmg
to take  advantage  of 1ower wage  cogts  in  Europe,
In my  opinion  the firet  of theee el.ements  -  fear  that  the  tariff.
provieione  of the  European  Common  Market  will  make  United  Statee ex-
ports  nor-competltive  -  hag been overstated.  Durlng  the entire  postwar
era,  American  exports  have been subject  to diecrlmination  under  systeme
of quantitative  reetrictiong  set up to  aafeguard  the baLance of payments  of
individual  European  countries.  With  the advent  of  LiberaLization  and free
convertlbility,  those restrictions  are  rapidly  dieappearlng.  Certainly  any
tariff  disadvantage  which  American:exports  may  suffer  under  the Common
Market  Treaty  will  be of a far  less  eerioug  order  than has been the caee
under  quantitative  restrictione,  And  L am  confident  that,  if  we conduct  our
own commercial  policies  aensiblyr  €y€tr thi.e element  of trade  digadvantage
can be diminiahed.-  6-
I am  sure  that  the  Committee  is  fully  aware  of the  recent  pro-
posals  of the  European  Economic  Commission  -  the go-called  Hallsteln
ProPosale  -  for  accelerating  the  coming  into  being  of the  Common  Market.
Thoge proposals  lnclude  the provieion  for  a ZAo/o  acroee-the-board  cut in
the  comrnon  external  tafiff  on industrial  producte.  The  Hallatein  propoaale
are  being  coneidered  thie  very  day by the Gouncil  of  Ministers  of the
European  Economlc  Community,  which  is meeting  in Bruesels.  The pro-
pogals  are,  I thlnk,  unmigtakable  evldence  of the determination  of the
Community  to Pursue a liberal  couree.  I am  convinced that the European
Common  Market  ie already  proving  an impreesive  force  in the dlrection
of a more  liberal  trade  policy  throughout  the whole Free  'fforld.
The other  element  which  has,  I believe,  been unduly emphasized,
ia the feeling  that American  firms  are being led to invest  ln Europe  in
order  to take  advantage  of low  European  wage  costg.  It  ig  well  known  that
wage cogtg are  only  one factor  of coat,  a cost f.actor that may be,  and,  in
a number  of cagee,  is,  offset  by higher  raw  material,  capltal,  power  and
other  comPonente of coet'  Even in thoee lnetances  \rrhere lower  wage coetg
have yielded  lower  unit  coets of production,  it  hag been my  observation
that moet  companiee  have regarded  this  ae only a subaidiary  consideration
which  tends to compeneate for  certain  of the dieadvantagee of overaeas
production,  Moreover,  I think  there  hae been coneiderable  exaggeration
ae to what  \riige  differentiaLe  in  lt'eetern  Europe  actually  mean.  Statietical-7-
comparison8  are  difficult  because  of the fact  that  a high percentage  -
aPProaching  thirty  to forty  percent  -  of the vlag? bill  in  some  European
countriee  lg  attributable  to fringe  benefits,  But  in  any event,  r think  it  ig
fair  to  say that  the dtfferential  in  wage cogte ie  eteadily  shrinking.
ltagea  are  not a  atatic  cogt factor.  Economlc  growth.and  height,
ened expectatl'ong  are  bringing  new presaure  for  wage increaseg.  A  drying
up of the fugttlve  labor  from  Eastern  Germanyi  the  creation  of  condltions
of full  employment,  even over-employment,  throughout  most  areaa of the
Community;  the development  of a more  confident  and more  aggteesive  labor
movement  -  theee factors  are  all  contributing  to laborrs  demand for  a
larger  ehare  of  revenues.  And  you rnuat  add to that  the  influence  of the
Common  Market  Treaty  itgelf.  By  requiring  the equalization  of conditiona
of labor,  the Treaty  will  tend to raige  the wage bill  in the lower  lncome
areaa  of the  Community.
lf,hatever,  therefore,  may  be the temporary  advantage  in  labor
cogte  enJoyed by producers  within  the  Gommon  Market,  that  advaatage
will  progreaaively  dieappear  if  Europe  continuee lts  preeent  rapid  growth.
American  producere,  in my  obeervation,  are  aware  of thie.  They 4t€r
for  the most  part,  not baging  their  investment  plang  fol  Europe  on the  cor-
tinr.rance of a labor  coet  advantage.  They  are  inveating,for  the long  pull  in
reliance  on the  continued  economic  growth  which  will  almogt  ilevitably  wipe
out that  advantage.-8-
I would  sum uP by  euggeeting,  therefore,  that  the egtabliahment
of production  facilities  in  Europe  is  a normal  and natural  movement  by
American  induetry  aeeking  a cloger  point  for  attack  on a new and promising
market'  American  indugtrial  firme  are  building  and buying  factoriee  in
Europe  today  for  the  same  reason  that,  during  the poatwar  period,  they
have been'bullding  factories  and developing  facilities  in  Canada and in  the
west  and eouthwget  gectione  of the united  Statee  -  because  canada  and
California  and Texag  and the whole  lf,egt  and Southwegt have been developing
faater  than the traditional  marketa  of the eagtern  parta  of our  country.
fn  a word,  I would  auggeet that  the  constructlon  of Amerigan
production  facilities  in  Europe  ig much more  analogous to the recent  trend
toward  eetablishing  production  facilitiee  ln the lVeet than to the phenomenon
of New  England  plants  running  away to the south  in  order  to exploit  a lower
wage-cogt  area.
In the era  of the  eo-called  dollar  ehortage,  when lndtvldual
European  countrleg  were  surrounded  by a wall  of quota  regtrlctions,
American  firms  were  faced wtth  a serious  dilemma.  They fgund lt  necee-
sary  to produce  behind  that  wall  in  order  to be able  to  eell  to  goft  curr.ency
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markets;  they  did  not,  however,  find  the  climate  propltious  for  long-term
inveetment  aince  they  had no confidence  in  either  the economlc  or  politicalstability  of  manyr Fluropean
participating  in  production
of ghort-term  profit.
count.ries.  They,  therefore,  aought ways  of
on a baeis  of  limited  liability  aud wtth  the  hope
Now the  situation  ie  altogether  different.  The American  indugtrial
communtty  believeg  that  the nations  of 'lYeetern.Europe, 
particularly  those
included  ln  the  Common  Market  and the Free  Trade  Aesociation,  are  polit-
ically  and economically  etable.  In  fact,  there  is  evidence  baged on recent
experience  that  the  Common  Market  countries  are  certainly  as  etable  and
may  be economically  mor6  stable  than even the  united  statee.
United States industrial  firms  are,  therefore,  undertaklng  forms
of direct  invegtment  different  from  those they undeitook  ten yeara  ago,
Instead  of patent and licenerng  arta^gemente,  they are,  for  the mogt part,
much  more  lnterested  in  the whole  or  partial  ownerehip  of production
facilities.  Firmg  with  a limited  cornmitment  in.  production.are  increaeing
that  commitment.  In  many  cases  firma  which  have never  before  done any
gubatantlal  buginess,  br  even.any bueinegs at all,  in Europe,  are  now geek_
lng  partners  or  facilitieg  in,llfeetern.Europe  wtth  commendable  resolution
.and gelf-i.E sutallce.
The  couree  of thig  invegtment.activlty  serves,  I think,  as added
proof  of the thesie  I put forth  a moment  ago,  that  it  is  not the fear  of tariff
or  quota  dlqadvanJages  or  the attraetion  of  low  wage  rateg  which  leade
American  induetry  to  establieh  production  facilitieg.  abroad.  It  is  economic-10-
growth  aud -a promiae  of  continued  growth.  The  low  wagee  and the  trade
restrictione  that  prevailed  in  Europe  during  the first  decade following  the
lvar  were  e:qrreasione  of the poverty  of the Eiurcirean economy.  poverty
did  not  attract, American  invegtment,  nor  will  it  ever  do eo.  The  invegtmeut
flow  began ln  impreselve  vol.ume only  when a surge  of economic  growth  had
begun to eliminate  low  wage levels  and trade  reetrictions
But  even the present  high  level  of invegtment  in  the Gommon
Market  doea not  mean  that  large  amountg  of American  capital  are  movlng
from  the Unlted.States  to Europe.  For  the most  patt American  companies
are  concentrating  on egtabliehing  beachheads  of production;  they  are  limiting
thelr  capital  investments.  In  1957, for  example,  accordlng  to Department
of Commerce  figuree,  only  lj%  of United Statee direct  forelgn  inveatment
in.Europe  conglgted  of capital  exported  from  thie  country.  Of the balance,
35To  cam€ from  funde  obtained  in  Europe,  aud the  rdmaining  46%owaa  prin-
cipally  out of reinvested  earninge  and depreciation  and deple6on.  In  l95g
thie  gituation  was  even more  pronounced.  Only  8% of.  total  direct  inveatment
in  Europe  was  rePresented  by the export  of United  Statee capital,  whlle  44rh
represented  funde  obtained  in  Europe.
I think  it  likely  that  a second wave  of American  direct  invegtment
in. Europe  will  occur  two  or  three  years  from  now  :  a wave  of greater  dimen_
eions  than  lriy  we  hawe seen up  to this  point.  If  Amerijcan  flrme  find  Europe
a profltable  place  to do bueiness  -  as hag been their  com111on  e:qrerience  inthe lagt  two  or  three  yeara  -  they  wilr  seek to e:qrand their  exiating  facilitiee.
They  will  have  gained  e:rperience  and,  with  experience,  the  coafidence  and
gense of aseurance  that  conduce to expaneion,
But  tt  ia  probable  that  thie  second  wave  witl  be financed  to  an errea
greater  extent  with  funds  found  in  Europe.  Today  manJr European  eubsid-
iaries  of American  corPorations  are  obtaining  capital  from  local  partnere
and by  limtted  borrowinge  from  European  financiaL  inetitutione.  But  in
many  cases  the  capital  etructure  of theee  subeidiariee  precludeg  a full  reeort
to  local  financing.  European  financial  inetitutions  are  reluctant  to  lend  money
to American  subgidiariee  which  have only  a small  equtty  in  relation  to debt,
when they  do not know  the parent  companles  as well  ae they know  egtabliehed
European  firmg.
This  situation  wlll  not  alwaye prevail.  As  earnlnge  are  accumu-
lated  and reinvested,  ae Amerlcan  companies  consolidate  thetr  relaHong
with  European  banks  and financial  institutions,  American  firms  dolng
bueinesa  ln  Europe  will  flnd  it  increasingly  attracilve  to  raige  their  money
on the  European  capital  market.  Thie  will  most  certainly  be true  lf  interegt
ratea  contlnue  to decline  in.Europe  while  they  rige  in  the  Untted.states.
Inlpltc4tions  o
Ae  the  committee  well  lcnowa,  the trend  tou,ard  the  increaged.
development  by  United  Statea firme  of production  facilltiee  in.Europe  hae
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often  bee,n viewed  with  alarm.  First,  the  fear  has been  erq)resaed  that  the
trend  would  lead  to  a drying  up  of  United  States  exports,  which  would,  in
turn,  contribute  to unemployment  at home.  [e:gn4,  there  has been,concern
that  direct  inveetment  atroad  would  exacerbate  the troublesome  United
State e balance-of-payments  position.
I do not regard  either  fear  ae well-founded.
The decline  of United States exports  between  1956  and 1959 was
due largely  to a ehrinkage  in  ehipments  of cotton,  petroleum,  iron  and eteel,
metal  producte,  aircraft  and non-ferrous  metals.  The decline  in thoge
exporte  cannot be attributed  to the  growth  of United  Statee investment  abroad.
on  the other  hand,  the liberarization  of quota  reetrictione,  which  has come
about with  the  recent  advent  of prosperity  and convertibility  in  Europe,  hae
opened up greater  markete  for  United Statee producte,  while  the growth  of
the EuroPean  economy  hae materially  increased  demand,  particularly  for
our  capital  goode.  In the firet  two  monthg  of this  year,  for  example,  Urrited
Statee  exporte  to the  Common  Market  amounted  to al.most $550 million,  or
52To  zbove the  same  period  in  1959,  and, 36%  above the  same period  in  1956,
to which  we tend to look  back  nostalgically  as a frnormalrr  period.  The  rea-
son for  this  increaae  in exporte  ie,  of course,  the phenomenal  growth  of
investment  and per  capita  income  in'weetern  Europe,  to which  the common
Market  is  making  a significant  contribution.
                                                        12similarly,  the  deveropments  rn our  import  trade  have  rtot been
'attributable  to  developments  in  united  States  foreign  investmente  .  rf  auto-
mobilee  are  left  out of the picture  -  and they  are  a  very epecial  ca'e,  since
the  import  trade  in  automobilee  developed  almost  entlrely  from  the  refusal
of the American  automobile  producers  to  make  atype  of car  the public
wanted  -  the  increase  in  our  imports  haa gone hand-in-hand  urith the increa'e
in  our  Grosa  National  Product;  total  importe  have remained  a stable  propor-
tion  of  our  GNP  -  3%.  one  of the  factorg  in  explaining  the  stable  pattern
of  our  import  growth  has been the  stab itity  of congumer  diepoaable  income
in  the  united  states  in  epite  of the bueineag  cycle  fluctuationsi  e:rporte,  on
the other  hand,  have been eeneitive  to cyclical  factors.
Direct  Invegtment  and the U. S.  Balance_
Nor  ig  it  true  that  private  direct  lnvegtment  in  Europe  hae had
an adveree  effect  on our  balance-of-paymente  posltion.
Etrjt,  every  yeat  since  the  end of world  rv'ar Ir,  and even before,
the  United  States  has been a net  recipient  of payments  from  the  rest  of the
world  on direct  private  investment  account.  By  thie  I  mean  that  income
from  such investmentg  hae exceeded  the outflow  of new inveetment  capital.
Durtng  the perlod  from  the beginning  of  1956 through  the flrgt  three-guarters
of  1959, for  example,  this  exceas  of iucome  over  outflow  aggregated more
than  two  billion  dollare  -  which.operated  to  aupport,  rather  than weaken,
our  balance-of-paymente  poeition.
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,  Se.q4g,  even  were  thie  not  the  caee,  it  could  uot  be argued  that
our  balance--of-payments  problem  of  1958 and 1959 w€,a caueed by  an in-
creased'  orrtflow  of  direct  private  foreign  invo.,stment;  the  outflow  waa  actually
leee  during  those  two  years  than in  1956  and,  1j57,  when our  deficit  wag  gub_
stantially  emaller.
Thir{,  as I have pointed  out earlier,  there  is  no vast  movemeat
of  United'statee  capital  into  Europe  today  in  the form  of direct  inveatment.
The  greatet  part  of our  new dlrect  investment  in.Europe  ia being  flnanced
either  through  the  retention  of income  earned  in  Europe  or  through  European
flnancial  gources.  'lf,e are  thue building  up the total  net agaet poeition  of
American  firme,  wtth  no drain  on our  own capital  market.  The future  income
from  those  asaets  ahould  serve  as a etablliztng  factor  for  our  total  economy,
Fo'.urfh,  a faft  part  of the  United  States  capital  whlch  haa gone
to  Europe  hae not been invegted  ln  new production  facilities  but  haa inetead
been uged to acquire  a share  in existing  facilities.
Conclueion
I do not  mean  to  euggeat by these  otservationa  that  the present
trend  toward  inveetment  by  united"stateg  firmg  in production  fa,cilitiea  in
Europe  will  be wlthout  effect  on the  ehape and  character  of  our  foreign
trade  or  even.of  our  domegtic  economy.  Invegtment  neceeearily  means
changea  in  production  ag well  ae in trade  patterne.  Some American  firme
-: .: :l  ir 
,r j:may  begin  to produce  goode in  Europe  which  they  are  now e:qrorting  to  :
European  markets.  They  may  even begin  to  serve  third  markets  by  e:cport-
ing  from  their  European  factories  the  sarre  kinds  of goods that  they  now
produce  in America.  Some categoriee  of iJniterl States  errports  will  conge-
quently  euffer,  but  others  will  benefit.
In  some  indugtrial.  eectors  European  subsidiaries  of American  Gotl-
paniee  rrtay even export  to the  United  Statee in  competition  with  U. S. -produced
goods.  But,  except  in  a relatlvely  f.ew induetries,  I think  it  highty  unlikely
that  such a practice  will  develop  in  eubgtantial  volume  for  many  years  to come.
Already  we are  beginning  to  see eigne of the building  up of a
reciprocal  inveetment  flow.  Some European  capital  is  coming  into  the
unlted  States  and finding  its  way  into  prod.uction  facilitieg,  under  the direct
management  of European  compahiee.  Thie  counter-trend  ie ltkely  to in-
creage  if,  as I hope,  our  own rate  of growth  ie  speeded up eo that it  more
nearly  aPProachee  the  rate  of growth  in  Europe  today.  But  in.any  event,
I  see no cauae for  alarm  about the  rate  with  which  United  States  firms  are
aeeking  European  production  facilitiee.  I think  it  is  clear,  as I have tried
to show,  that thie  offere  no menace either  to our.merchand.ige  trade  or  oilr
over-all  balance-of-payments.  On the contra;rft  growth  in Europe  wilt,  I
am fully  pereuaded,  be a real  stimulant  to American  exports,  for  the leegon
of  hietory  ie  that  we exPort  most  to  countries  wtth  the highest  standards  of
living.and  to  countries  in  which  we have our  largest  .investments.
In  the Interim  Staff  Report  to your  Committee,  the point  hae been
quite  properly  made  that  for  us to  reduce  the flow  of private  investment
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a'broad  would  be  inconsistent  with  our  position  of  moral,and  political  leader-
ship  in  the world,  It would  also,  I think,  interrupt  an historic  process  which
ia  altogether  healthy.  Jugt  as we  hare  ceen the  expanaion  of  United  States
firms  from  regional  to  nation-wtde  production,  we are  nori  witneseing  the
beginning  of  their  expanslon  from  nation-wide  to  world-wide  productio:r.
Many  of  our  indugtrial  flrme  have  in  the  past  ehown a parochial  attitude
toward  world  trade.  They  have been content  to  concentrate  on the  expanding
domeatic  market,  leaving  their  foreign  businegg  to be done by an export  or
foreign  department,  which  they  have regarded  as a rather  unlntereeting
otep-child.  But  ag thie  country  hae expanded ita  political  reaponsibilltiea
to embrace  a  greatpart  of the world,  go American  induetry  muat  expand
its  own horizong  of production  and trade.  Iffhat we are  witnesalng  today,
ag American  firmg  acquire  production  facilitiee  in Europe,  ie the classic
purauit  of a normal,  healthy,  economlc  motive  of  eeeking  to exploit  a new
mass  market.  Thts  Process  ehould not,  I think,  be viewed  with  alarm
but  with  satigfaction  and approval.  After  all,  it  ig proof  of the  continued
vitality  of American  industry.